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ABSTRACT
Soccer (football in the non-American terminology) is the most globalized
sport. Free circulation of players has markedly increased during the last
ten to fifteen years as limits on the number of foreign players in the
European leagues have been lifted, and clubs have become more
commercially-minded. On the other hand, the rules governing national
team competition have remained restrictive: players can play only for the
country where they were  born. We show that, in a model where there is
free circulation of labor, increasing returns to scale,  and endogeneity of
skills, this produces on the one hand, higher overall quality of the game
and increasing inequality of results among clubs, and on the other hand,
lower inequality in the national teams’ performances. The empirical
examples from the history of the European Champions’ League and the
World Cup support the implications of the model. We argue in the
conclusions, that soccer’s global rules allow poor countries to capture
some of their “leg drain”, that is the improved skills which their players
have acquired playing for better foreign clubs. This provides an example
as how forces of efficiency but also inequality unleashed by globalization
can be harnessed by the existence of global institutions to help improve
the outcome for the poor countries. 
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1. Introduction
The issues of increasing returns to scale, technological transfer and endogenous
skills have received a lot of attention from the new literature on growth. Its objective was
to show how violations of some neoclassical assumptions might lead to the concentration
of capital and labor in the most developed parts of the world, or most developed parts of a
country (see Easterly 2001 and the references there). This is the opposite of what we
would expect if the diminishing marginal productivity of capital or skills were to hold,
for then their returns would be greater in less capital- or less skill-rich countries and
hence the incentive to move there would be greater. With these new assumptions, one is
better able to explain Lucas’s (1990) paradox of capital flowing from rich to rich
countries, or of the increasing inequality (divergence) between per capita incomes of the
countries of the world.
An almost perfect example to address these issues is the field of soccer. Soccer
(football in the non-American terminology) is easily the most globalized of all sports,
where globalization is defined as the ability of players to move between clubs and
countries. Globalization, while always present in soccer, has increased by leaps and
bounds in the most recent period as limits on the number of foreign players have been all
but lifted in the soccer’s main market (Europe), and as clubs have become much more
commercialized moving away from their old “socially-conscious” role where they often
functioned as part of trade unions, political parties or community organizations. The
question we want to address is the one of the effects of free circulation of labor combined
with increasing commercialization on the concentration of soccer quality in a few top
clubs. 
But in addition to the club arena which is now almost wholly commercialized,
soccer is very interesting because it also has the national team arena where the rules,
imposed by the soccer world-wide governing body of FIFA (Fédération Internationale
de Football Association), severely limit the role of money and do not allow labor
mobility—that is, do not allow players to change national teams. It is this combination of
a purely commercialized and an almost uncommercialized domain in the same activity
that enables us to study the effects of two different institutional arrangements on the
concentration of quality, or differently put on inequality. As we shall argue in the
Conclusions, it is also this combination of commercialization and regulation that, we
believe, presents some interesting lessons for the future of globalization and for the
introduction of some global rules whereby the potential unleashed by globalization is
harnessed to help the poor.3
2. The model
Skills and soccer  production function. Suppose that the skills of players are
ordered in such a way that A>B, B>C etc, and after Y>Z, that A’>B’ all the way to
Y’>Z’. Differences between skill levels are constant so that A-B = C-D = constant etc.
Let also there be 26 countries each with two players of different skills. (Obviously, we
could multiply both the skill levels and the number of countries but the generality of the
results is not affected by our assumption.) Finally, let the production function of a soccer
team gi (for goals) be of the type
2 1S S gi =
where subscript i denotes the soccer team, and S1 and S2 skill levels. Then, a team
employing players with levels K and L will have a production function gi=KL. The
production function is multiplicative indicating increasing returns to scale as well as
complementarity of skills. Clearly, if a player of a given skill plays with a better player,
the output will increase in constant terms with the skill of the co-player.
We next assume that skills are distributed within each country normally (or at
least symmetrically as shown in Figure 1) but with more populous countries (where
populous is defined in terms of number of registered soccer players, both amateurs and
professionals, or just as the number of people who play soccer) having a greater variance
of skills. Thus, more populous countries will have both more players (in absolute
numbers) at each level of skills, and will have more highly skilled players. The
distribution of skills in two countries (large and small) is displayed in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Skill distribution in more and less populous countries
As we can easily see, the most skilled player(s) will be found in the largest
(soccer) countries. The number of people (in the world) who become soccer players  will
be determined by the overall world demand for soccer. But, in accordance with our
earlier assumptions, we take it that the demand is such that only players down to the level
of Z’ are accepted, that is only people with skills equal and above that level will find a
job as professional soccer players.
Skill level
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The final assumption concerns the distribution of skills by countries. The most
populous country will have the player(s) with the top skill A, and, of course, it will have
players with lower skills too (this is derived from the assumption of the skill distribution
in Figure 1). Let the next populous country have its best player with the  skill B, the best
player in the third most populous will be with the  level C etc. Once we have exhausted
all the countries, with the smallest soccer country’s best player having skill level Z, we
look at the second best player by country. The second best player in the most populous
country will be of level A’, and thus again all the way to the second best player in the
smallest country being of the level Z’. Consequently, the most populous country will
have, in the professional soccer, players of levels A and A’; the second most populous
country of levels B and B’, etc. and the smallest country players of levels Z and Z’. 
Skill levels and countries’ rank  by soccer population will thus coincide (in terms
of notation). Think of the most populous country as Brazil: it will have (two) professional
soccer players and their levels will be A and A’; the second most populous country may
be Italy with skill levels B and B’ etc.
No mobility of labor. We assume that in each country, there is only one
commercial professional club, and of course one national team. The production functions
whether for clubs or for national teams is of the same form since soccer is the same game
whether played between clubs such as Manchester United and Real Madrid or between
national teams such as Brazil and Germany. If there is no mobility of players between
countries, the quality of the club and of the national team will be the same since the same
players will play in both. Thus Brazil’s only club’s (think of Santos from Sao Paolo) and
Brazilian national team’s, production functions will be 
' AA gA =  
The smallest soccer-wise country and its club will have a production function 
' ZZ gZ =  
The top to the bottom quality ratio will, in such a world, be AA’ to ZZ’—both for
the clubs and for the national teams. If, for illustrative purposes, we give to the top skill
level (A) value of 52, the next level 51 etc….all the way to Z’=1, then the production
function of the most populous country will be 52x26, of the second largest country 51x25
and of the smallest country 27x1. The Gini coefficient of inequality in skill quality (or in
goals) calculated across all countries will in that case amount to 38.9.
  Introducing mobility of labor. Let us now introduce mobility of labor, or the
possibility of the “leg drain”, that is of players changing the club for which they play by
moving to a country different from theirs. Notice an important definitional difference
between clubs and national teams. Clubs are commercial entities that maximize profits
and that buy and sell players. The national teams’ rules are different: only those players
born as (say) Brazilians can play for Brazil. This is by the way an almost 100 percent5
accurate description of the difference between clubs and national teams in soccer.
Ronaldo, Maradona or Beckham can (and did) play for a number of clubs but only for
respectively Brazilian, Argentinean  or English national teams. 
The prefix “almost” in the earlier sentence is needed to indicate that the national
team rule is such that one cannot change his national teams once he has played for it. But
if for example (as we have seen in a few instances) a Nigerian player, who has never been
selected for his national squad  and who comes to play for a club in Poland, is then
offered the possibility of the Polish citizenship and of joining the Polish national team,
and if he accepts that (and in this case specific case, he did) he is allowed to play for the
Polish national team. The key requirement is that he has not played for any other national
team before. Had he even  once played for the Nigerian national team, the change in
citizenship would not have mattered at all.  Likewise his decision to play for the Polish
national team means that he cannot ever play for another. There is thus  a uniqueness in
the relationship between a player and a national team, a uniqueness that is almost always
determined by one’s place of birth, and a uniqueness that is absent in the relationship
between players and clubs.  The just explained rules were introduced in the late 1960’s in
order to prevent spurious changes in  nationality and thus national teams becoming more
like clubs.
2 It is precisely this difference between club and national team rules which will
make the introduction of labor mobility affect them differently, and which will be the
core part of our argument. In addition, national team is one off activity largely devoid of
significant direct commercial interest to players;
3 clubs is where people’s activity takes
place and where players earn their money.  Clubs are they day jobs.
Consequently after the introduction of full labor mobility, there will be no change
in the production functions at the national level. The top country’s national teams’
production function remains AA’. 
Consider the club scene now. Let the richest (country) club, in the soccer sense,
be able to acquire the most talented players, both A and B; the second richest country, the
next “crop” of players, C and D and so forth. 
4 It does not matter whether the richest club
is from the most populous country or not. For the sake of intuitive understanding,
                                                
2 Ladislav Kubala, originally from Hungary  was the most famous player in this respect, He was probably
the only player in history to have played for three national teams: Hungary, Czechoslovakia and  Spain.
Also, in the 1930’s Italy used to give citizenship to the best Argentinean players of often dubious Italian
extraction (the so-called “oriundi”) in order to let them play for the Italian national team. Raimundo Orsi
and Luisito Monti were the most famous examples, Monti moreover the only player in history to have
played the two World Cup finals for two different countries, Argentina in 1930 and Italy in 1934. Notice
than in those years the mobility of labor which was much inferior to today’s applied equally to both clubs
and national teams.
3 Obviously there could be indirect financial gain from playing well in a national team. International
competitions like the World Cup is akin to a huge market place where, playing under the eye of the world
audience and most experienced coaches, heretofore unknown players have a chance to attract attention to
themselves, become famous and garner lucrative club contract. But no player has ever become rich from
the money earned while playing for his national squad.
4 Recall that the assumption one country = one club still holds.6
suppose that the richest country (where we can think of it as GDP per capita corrected for
soccer interest of the population)
5 is  Spain. We assume it  sufficiently richer than  the
second next country (say, Italy) so that its club can acquire both top players. Similarly,
Italy must be sufficiently richer than the next best country (say, England) so that it can
acquire both players C and D etc.  
The production function of the club (in Spain) will now be AB, the production
function of the club in Italy  CD, in England EF  etc, all the way to the production
function of the club  in the (soccer) poorest country Y’Z’. The top-to-bottom ratio for the








. Using the same illustrative numerical example, the Spanish club’s
production function value will be 52x51, the Italian club’s  50x49 etc, and the poorest
country’s club 2x1. The Gini coefficient (of concentration) will have increased to 49.5.
Notice also that, because of the multiplicative nature of the production process, the
average quality of soccer will have increased; in our illustrative numerical example, it
will have risen by more than 50 percent.
6 In conclusion, the quality of the game would go
up, there would be greater concentration of quality among the clubs, but nothing will
have changed regarding the national teams. 
Endogeneizing skills. So far we have assumed that skill levels are given. We have
thought of them as innate to individuals. But it is quite reasonable to assume that skills
improve in function of people with whom players interact. We can see this as an
augmenting technological change. Now it is only clubs (in which players play more than
90 percent of  their overall number of games, and spend more than 95 percent of effective
time),  that matter for skill improvement. The national team simply takes these skills as
given. It does not add or detract from them. 
Since each club is composed of a pair of players we shall assume that only the
less good player’s skills improve while those of the better player remain the same.
However, the improvement cannot be such as to overturn the ordinal ranking. Thus the
new skill level of player B will Bγ(A)<A  where gamma denotes the skills improvement
function. The gamma function will be increasing in skill level, that is γ’(s)>0 and
possibly too γ”(s)>0 although the sign of the second derivative does not really matter for
our results.
                                                
5 We assume soccer interest of the population to be exogenous. It would greatly complicate the matters if
soccer interest itself were endogenous, that is depended on who plays in that country’s club. This is not,
however, an unreasonable assumption for indeed people’s interest increases when club buys good players.
Yet, as the experience suggest, there must be some pre-determined level of interest. Otherwise Ronaldo
would be playing in Los Angeles rather than in Madrid.
6 The average quality is obtained as the sum of qualities of all clubs (say, 52x51 + 50x49 etc) divided by 26
clubs.7
The effect of endogenizing skills will be obviously to further widen the
differences between the clubs. The top-to-bottom ratio will now be 











Endogenous skills will have an effect on the quality of national teams. Consider
the national team of the most populous country A. Its production function will be
unchanged at AA’ (these two players play in clubs where they are the best players so
their skills, by assumption, cannot improve). The second national team’s production
function will however be BB’γ(A) γ(A’) etc. The distance  between the two best national
team will be reduced, but the distance between the second and the third national team will
increase. The same regularity will continue for all the other ordered pairs. The overall
effect of such a change on a mean-normalized measure of inequality (like the Gini) will
be to reduce it because the sum of absolute distances will remain unchanged while the
average skill level will have increased.
7
However, endogeneity of skills exists independently of mobility of labor. It is thus
reasonable to assume that it has existed even before national borders opened up. In that
case, the quality of the best national team, prior to the opening of borders, was AA’γ(A),
the quality of the second was BB’γ(B) etc. Thus, the top-to-bottom ratio before the
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. Since γ(.) > 0, inequality
must have unambiguously declined after the opening of borders—if skills are
endogenous. Notice for example that the quality of the top national team has declined
because neither of its players benefited from playing with players better than himself. In
the past however player of skill level A’ benefited from playing with a player of skill
level A. This seems an a priori plausible conclusion. For taking the two Brazilian stars
Ronaldo and Lucio as players of levels A and A’, it is reasonable to believe that had
Lucio played with Ronaldo in the same club in Brazil, his skill level would have
improved. But if Lucio is the best player in Bayer Leverkusen there is no one there from
whom he can learn new skills. On the other hand, small soccer nations would gain since
their players will now play with those who are better than they and from whom they can
learn.
 8
Implications. We have seen that the introduction  of labor mobility under the
conditions of uneven concentration of financial power of the clubs will have increased
                                                
7 Before, the average skill level in the world was ZA’, now, it is Zγ(Y)A’.
8  In words of Bruce Arena, the former US national team coach,  "There's no doubt that a number of
[American] players have benefited playing outside the U.S."…"We are helped at the national level by
having a nucleus of players who are training and playing at the highest levels." (available at
http://www.soccertimes.com/wagman/1999/dec23.htm). 8
concentration of club quality but left the differences between national teams unchanged.
When we introduce endogeneity of  skills too (that is, when we combine international
mobility of labor and endogenous skills) the club quality will become further
concentrated while the national teams quality differences will be reduced.  In the next
section, we shall present some empirical evidence regarding these hypotheses.
   
3. Empirical  analysis
In the empirical part, we shall test our hypotheses on how globalization affects
inequality among clubs and nations on three examples of the premier competitions
between the clubs and nations. These are the Champions’ League (formerly, the Cup of
Champions), the most distinguished European club competition; Italian Serie A, arguably
the best national club championship, and World Cup, the most important soccer
competition between countries. We shall look at  what happened to the concentration of
quality among clubs, and then among nations, after the introduction  of free mobility of
labor. 
The absence of  free labor mobility in soccer was always an issue of the demand
side. That is, there was never any Brazil-based impediment for a Brazilian player to go
play in Italy. The problem was that the number of foreign players in the largest soccer
countries, that is the richest countries in our model where the financial demand for a
given skill level is the greatest (Spain, Italy, Germany, England), was subject to a quota.
Normally only up to two or three foreign players were allowed to play in a club. Thus, for
example, the most powerful European clubs (AC Milan, Inter or Real Madrid) could use
only two non-Italian or non-Spanish players in their games. The rules were particularly
restrictive for national championship where they remained in effect until the  mid-1980’s.
For the European club championship (Cup of Champions) the rules began to be relaxed  a
bit earlier: for example, clubs were allowed to field three instead of two “foreigners.” The
quotas thus played a role of limiting the demand for players and impeding (or preventing)
free circulation of labor.
The biggest turning point in this area came with the Bosman rule. Bosman was a
Belgian player who played for FC Liege and who in 1995 sued his club and the Belgian
soccer association, and later the European Soccer Association (UEFA) for preventing his
transfer to a French club. He argued that the transfer rules and nationality clauses were
not compatible with the Treaty of Rome and free movement of workers. The European
court ruled against the right of the club (in this case, FC Liege) of asking for a transfer
fee after the contract with the player had expired. 
9 The court also ruled against the then
existing practice of limiting the number of foreign players and treating players from other
European Union countries as foreigners. As mentioned, Italian clubs treated its French or
Dutch players differently from its Italian players—a thing which was not allowed in any
other economic activity. The European court thus ruled that the difference of treatment of
the nationals from other European Union countries  was anti-constitutional. This opened
the floodgates for a fully free movement of players within the European Union, and
                                                
9 On the consequences of the ban on transfer fees, see the recent article by Feess and Muehlheuser (2003).9
buried the two-foreign players rule. The limits on non-European nationals still remained,
but were gradually raised to six or more in Italy, and were entirely lifted in  England and
Spain. Today, for example, London’s Chelsea at times fields as many as nine foreign
players (out of 11), a thing absolutely out of the realm of the possible only a decade or so
ago. 
Removal of the limits on labor movement occurred (and might not have been
altogether independent) from a movement toward much greater commercialization of
club-level soccer. London’s Chelsea is now owned by one of the Russian oligarchs
(Roman Abramovich), and Manchester United, for example, is a company whose shares
are traded on the London Stock exchange. Clubs began to be run much more like
commercial enterprises than it was the case in the past where social and political concerns
loomed larger. For example, Juventus was bought by the Agnelli family in the 1920’s
mostly as an adjunct to their FIAT Motorworks. Its objective was to promote loyalty to
FIAT among the newly-arrived Southern Italian workforce and to provide their Sundays
with some entertainment. Innumerable clubs were formed as amateur,  trade-union or
political associations in the vein of what after the work of Putnam we are used to see as
social-capital building voluntary associations. This was the trend much in evidence in
Europe in the period between the turn of the century and the Second World  War (when
most of today’s great teams were founded). A typical pattern was that the clubs were
formed around some common non-commercial interests, be it amateur sportsmanship of
the inter-war German and Central European variety (Frei Kultur Korps) that glorified
physical education, influence of English migrant workers,
10 ethnicity, or perhaps most
importantly, political preferences. 
11  In many countries where Communist parties were
banned in the inter-War period, left wing associations operated under the guise of soccer
teams, thus promoting their cause as well as camaraderie among the members. But in the
Europe and South America of the sixties and seventies, this was gradually changing as
commercial interests and motivations became more important than the building of social
capital. The opening up of the 1990’s was a logical conclusion of the process.  And
indeed this was how full-fledged globalization came to soccer.
As already mentioned, we shall study the effects of globalization on soccer (clubs
and national teams) by looking at the concentration of quality (measured by the
                                                
10British expatriates were very influential in creating a number of soccer teams around the globe. Some of
that influence is still visible today in clubs’ names: AC Milan (not Milano), River Plate from Buenos Aires,
Grasshoppers in Switzerland, Athletic (not Atletico) Bilbao from the Basque country etc. The Argentine
soccer federation was founded by an Englishman.
11 The first almost entirely Jewish teams were Hakoah, the winner of the first Austrian professional league
in 1925, and MTK in Hungary.  The former began as a way “to create healthy youths who might one day
take residence in Palestine” (Murray, 1998, p.53).  Another burning social issue, particularly in Brazil, was
the integration of blacks. Political undertones, particularly so for the teams hailing from the same city, were
never absent from soccer: “royal”  Madrid vs. autonomy-minded FC Barcelona, left-wing Roma vs. right-
wing Lazio, AC  Milan vs. its internationalist splinter of Inter, “people’s club” of Boca Juniors vs. the
“milionarios” of the River Plate, solid bourgeois of FC Torino vs. workers (and fascists) of Juventus,
nationalist Red Star of Belgrade vs. Titoist Partizan, Army-supported Moscow CSKA vs. KGB-preferred
Dynamo, the “bourgeois” Slavia, Prague vs. the Army-founded and Communist Dukla, the anti-Semitic
Ferencvaros of Budapest vs. the Jewish MTK.10
concentration of results) in the Champions’ League and the World Cup. Note that the
very change in the name of the Champions’ League (from Cup of Champions) was
indicative of the dramatic change in the structure of the competition and its
commercialization. Before the change, the Cup involved only the champions from each
European nation. But that meant that Malta provided one club, the same as the
immeasurable better Italian Serie A. This was a one country=one vote system. If one
wanted to make sure that the competition makes more money, one had to attract the really
best European clubs to participate in it, which meant not only one but possibly several
Italian, or English or Spanish clubs, and similarly to limit the access to the small
European clubs.
12 Thus, nowadays, better European leagues have each three slots in the
Champions’ Leagues, the second-tier leagues have two slots etc. all the way to the
countries that have no participants in the League at all.
13 For example, in the 2003 edition
of the Champions’ League, only 15 out of more than 40 European countries have a
participating club. 
For the Champions’ League we  use two measures of concentration: the number
of teams who have reached the quarterfinals within each five-year period, and the Gini
coefficient of success within each five-year period. We use the five-year periods since a
measure of quality concentration that we have in mind implies a persistence in quality:
the same (rich) teams are best from year to year. Five-year period is a reasonable period
over which this concentration can be observed and calculated. 
We need to explain the logic behind these two measures. The maximum possible
dispersion would occur if each year there  would be eight different clubs who would
qualify for the quarterfinals. Thus, over the five-year period, we would have a total of 40
clubs who would have been quarter-finalists. The maximum possible concentration, of
course, would occur if each year the same eight teams were to quality for the
quarterfinals. Thus, the smaller the number of teams among the elite, the more
concentrated the competition. 
The second measure (the Gini coefficient) is based on an assignment of points: we
give 4 points to the winner of the competition, 3 points to the finalist, 2 points to each
semi-finalist, and 1 point to each quarterfinalist. Since the points are given for each
round, that means that the winner gets 10 points (4+3+2+1), the finalist 6, the two semi-
finalists 2 and the for quarterfinalists 1 each. We then calculate the concentration of
results within each five-year interval. Thus, an increased concentration will not be
                                                
12 The new format of the league evolved when the European soccer federation UEFA was faced by the
threat led by the owner of AC Milan, the future Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi that the top
European teams will withdraw from the UEFA-sponsored cups and create their own league. The sale of the
television rights for such a league also featured prominently in Berlusconi’s idea.
13 The number of slots per country is not fixed but is a function of each country’s clubs’ performance in the
previous year’s of European competitions (and, of course, of the performance of each club itself). Thus the
best clubs qualify directly. But also if the Italian league were suddenly to deteriorate, and its clubs to do
badly in European competitions, the number of slots would be reduced.   The allocation system is quite a
complex one but the essential point is that it sought to replace a one country-one vote system by a quality
adjusted on importance of the commercial factors.11
reflected only in the number of teams that are part of the elite (as in the first measure) but
also in the fact that, over a five-year period, the best teams will tend to be the same (e.g.
the same team tends to win each year, or to be the semi-finalist etc.)  We need to take
both measures into account. The first measures concentration of the elite, the second the
concentration of the elite and the concentration among the elite. To explain: it could
happen that the number of teams that are quarterfinalists decreases—thus we have a
concentration of the elite—but that on the other hand, the concentration among these few
(say, a dozen) teams goes down. Theoretically, the concentration among them could be
very small as each of them, almost randomly, ends up by being a winner one year, a
finalist another, semi-finalist the third etc. Our second measure takes this aspect into
account as well.
Table 1 shows these two measures. As we postulated in our hypothesis, from the
late 1980’s we observe an increasing concentration, both of the elite and among the elite.
While in the 1960’s and the 1970’s between 28 and 30 teams qualified for the elite during
each quinquennium, that number has steadily decreased since the mid-1980’s to only 22
in the most recent five-year period. In addition, we notice an increased  concentration
among the elite: the concentration coefficient has increased from about 62 in the mid-
1980’s to 77 in the most recent period, the highest value ever.
14  What is interesting is to
contrast the deconcentration which took place between 1963 and 1987 with the Gini
coefficient going almost steadily down, and then a sharp reversal of the trend during the
last 15 years. During the last decade—the period which coincided with a markedly
increased mobility of labor, freer competition, and greater club commercialization—the
concentration of club quality increased quite significantly. In conclusion, there is little
doubt that the premier European club competition has become much more concentrated
(in terms of success) as global soccer market has come to life.
Our second example dealing with clubs takes the composition of Italian Serie A.
Italy is interesting not only because its championship is probably the toughest in the
world, but also because it is economically divided between the rich North and the poorer
South. In that Italy is unique: income differences between Lombardia and Mezzogiorno
are much greater than among the parts of Germany, England or Spain which also have
first rate national leagues. Thus, given the same level of soccer interest among the
population (a hypothesis which we can easily accept for Italy), greater commercialization
of club soccer should increase the share of clubs from the richer North. This is indeed
what we notice in Figure 2 which plots the three-year average number of clubs from the
                                                
14 Note that the minimum concentration is not zero as in ordinary inequality measurement. Here, we are
dealing with a hierarchical system where there must be a winner, a finalist etc. If both the clubs and the
elite were totally dispersed, there would be (in each five-year period) 20 quarterfinalists, 10 semifinalist, 5
finalists, and 5 winners. Assigning them the points (1 to 10), yield a concentration  coefficient of 46.1. The
maximum concentration coefficient is not 100 either. If there is an extreme level of concentration, there
would be only 8 same teams in the elite each year, and the winner would be always the same team, the
finalist too, the semi-finalist would be the  two same four  teams etc. In that case, 32 clubs will be allocated
zeros (they never made it to the elite); 4 clubs would be “earn” 5 points (always quarterfinalists), two clubs,
ten points each; one club twenty points. The concentration coefficient would be 89.2.12
South in the Italian Serie A.
15 The average number of Southern clubs used to be vary
between 3 and 4 (out of 16 to 18 clubs in the Serie A) during the entire period from
1960’s to the-1990’s. Now, for the first time since World War II, in 2002 and 2003, there
are no Southern teams at call in Serie A. The “purgatory” has been complete and it
included such clubs like former Italian champions Napoli and Cagliari. Both are now in
Serie B. 
Figure 2. Three-year moving average of  the number of Southern teams
in Italian Serie A
Source: Data from http://www.soccerage.com/en/23/00001.html. 
Our example, dealing with national teams, is taken from the World Cup. Here we
cannot adopt the same methodology because the World Cup takes place only once every
four years. We shall measure concentration differently, first, by looking at the number of
“new” national teams that have qualified for the quarterfinals (that is, national teams that
previously have not qualified for among the top eight), and then at the goal difference
between the members of elite. If quality between national teams is gradually getting more
similar, then we would expect—in contrast to the situation at the club level—to find an
increase in “new” national teams (as previous outsiders join the elite), and a reduction in
the goal difference among the elite teams. Calculations are shown in Table 2. 
                                                
















































   
Table 1. Concentration of winning teams in the League of Champions within each five-year period





















for the quarterfinals  
30 26 28 28 30 29 26 26 22
Concentration
coefficient (Gini) 
65.9 73.5 68.1 70.0 64.3 62.2 70.2 72.0 76.9
Note: The maximum number of teams among the top eight is 40, the minimum 8. The maximum concentration coefficient is 89.2, the minimum is 46.1. 
Source: http://www.uefa.com/competitions/ucl/AllTimeStatistics/index.html. 14
Table 2. Post World War II World Cups
1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002
Number of “new”
teams among the top
eight    na 2 3 1 2 2 3 0 1 0 2 2 2 3
Goal difference among
the elite 2.50 2.33 2.38 1.50 1.63 1.75 1.43 1.71 1.19 1.00 0.63 1.13 1.25 0.88
Note: The “elite” always includes eight top teams except in 1950 where the second stage of the completion was directly “semi-finals” (four top teams), and in
1982, where due to a peculiar rules, the “quarterfinals” stage included 12 teams. “New” is defined as a national team that had never previously qualified among
the top eight teams. In 1950, the competition went straight to to-four  stage.
Source: http://fifaworldcup.yahoo.com/02/en/pf/h/pwc/index.html. 15
The results show that after a period of strong dominance of the traditionally best
soccer  nations (Brazil, Germany, Argentina, Italy) in the 1970’s and 1980’s, the situation
changed in the 1980’s. In the four latest World Cups, there  were always at least two
newcomers among the top eight national teams. In each Cup, therefore, the newcomers
represented about ¼ of the elite. Note also that the very way the calculations are done
biases the results against our hypothesis (the increase in the newcomers) because as more
nations make it at least once to the elite, they lose the status of the “newcomer.” In other
words, the pool of the potential newcomers is gradually getting smaller. Thus if Turkey, a
traditional soccer lightweight, which qualified among the top eight (and the top four) in
the last World Cup, were to be part of the elite in the next World Cup, it would not be
treated as a newcomer any more.
The quality difference between the elite, measured by the average goal difference
between the winners and losers during the elite games (quarterfinals and higher), shows a
gradual decrease. In other words, the quality differences between national teams seem to
be getting smaller. After always exceeding two goals in the 1950’s, the difference was
above 1.5 goals in the entire 1962-78 period. But beginning with 1982, the maximum
difference was 1.25, and the average difference was one goal.  Figure 3 shows the three-
World Cup rolling average where the gradual decline in the goal differential is apparent. 
The same decrease in the goal differential is present for if we look at all national
teams participating in the World Cups. This is perhaps even more indicative of the
general leveling of quality because the number of nations participating in the World Cups
has expanded from 16 in the 1950-1978 period to 24 between 1982 and 1994, and then to
32 since 1998. The expansion has opened the doors of the World Cup to many countries
without much experience of the game and whose performance might have been expected
to be rather mediocre (and hence that they would lose with large goal differences). And
while it has indeed happened a few times, 
16 this was not the case overall—and the
average goal differential has continued to decrease.
                                                
16 In 1974, Yugoslavia beat Zaire by 8-0, and in 2002, Germany similarly overwhelmed Saudi Arabia by 8-
0.16
Figure 3. Goal difference among World Cup all national teams and World Cup elite

















4. Conclusions: implications for “alter-globalization”
The paper argued that free circulation of labor, increasing returns and endogenous
skills will, under the conditions of unequal initial distribution of resources, tend to
produce an increasing concentration in outcomes whether it be income or soccer results.
The model is a simple one and is based on a few assumptions, the important one being
the increasing returns to scale—an assumption that is sensible to make for many complex
production processes. Free circulation of labor and increasing returns lead to an overall
increase in output, or in the model here, in the quality of soccer as best players are paired
to play with those who are also among the best.
The problem is that, under the purely commercial rules, this overall improved
quality of the game is accompanied by increased inequality. The (soccer) poor countries
that “export” their players receive nothing. Best players themselves are better-off because
they are paid more and because their quality improves as they have a chance to learn new
skills by playing with better players than had they stayed at home.
The welfare effects are ambiguous too. There is no doubt that the improved
quality of the game and vastly better telecommunications (including live transmission of
the most important national league games all over Europe) have provided lots of
additional pleasures to the soccer afficionados. Thus, on an average weekend, an ordinary
soccer fan in Europe can watch without leaving his room the best Italian, or Spanish or
English teams battle each other. The sport has become truly global not only in drawing
players from across the globe but providing supporter bases for clubs far away from their
traditional home base. Thus Manchester United has a very strong following in Asia and
more recently in North America. 
17English Premier league games are routinely
transmitted and watched all over Asia. But there were also some losses. Medium-sized
cities, by population or wealth, have all but lost a chance of ever hosting on their local
fields the world’s best clubs. While Champions’ Cup in its earlier set-up allowed the best
teams from say, Switerland or Bulgaria to meet, with the lack of a draw, Real Madrid and
thus provided to local audiences an opportunity to see the best players of the world not
only on TV but in flesh, the new arrangments make such a possibility fairly remote. Had
Berlusconi even more radical proposal been accepted, the best teams would have never
played with second-tier teams. There is thus a clear segmentation: the best play with the
best, the second-tier with the second-tier and so forth. This in turn must have led to some
loss of welfare among the fans because of attachment to local clubs and desire to see
them, at least from time to time, measure themselves up against the very best. But, as
mentioned, this has taken place against the backdrop of significantly improved overall
quality of the game.
In order to redistribute overall gains from higher global output, some overarching
global rules are needed. They are provided, in soccer, by the role of FIFA, the
                                                
17 Manchester United has official supporter clubs in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Japan (see
http://www.unitedmanchester.com/sport/mufc-supporters-asia.htm). 18
international soccer body that regulates competition between national teams. FIFA rules
prohibit switching of national teams. Thus the rich countries cannot buy poor countries’
soccer player to play in the World Cup. And (soccer) poor countries are able to capture
the benefits of higher skills acquired by their players abroad when they temporarily return
home to play for their national squads.
Similarly, if greater freedom of circulation of labor is introduced, we might expect
an increase in world level of output. But this might come to a cost of increased inequality,
further exclusion of poor countries, and some loss of welfare due to the loss of “local
flavor.” For the process to be more socially acceptable and more equitable, it is therefore
necessary that some global, non-commercial, rules accompany market-driven
globalization. Borrowing from FIFA rules, one could envisage an obligation, enforced by
the international bodies, whereby all highly-skilled emigrants from poor to rich countries
would be obliged to spend one year out of each five, working in their native country, for
a total of say, up to four or five years over their working lives. This could be made a
requirement for the issuance of work permits in rich countries. Such rules are unlikely to
be imposed and enforced by individual rich countries because that would place them at
disadvantage compared to their competitors. But if the rules were global, each rich
country would be obliged to follow them and would be equally affected. 
As in the World Cup, where soccer poor countries are able to capture “leg”
improvement of their players once every four years in the World Cup, income poor
countries would be able to capture some of the “brain” improvements of their workers.
This type of socially more conscious globalization would combine the purely commercial
interests (reflected in best players being picked by richest clubs) with the existence of a
global authority that would impose non-commercial rules, and mitigate somewhat the
harshness of the commercial-only outcomes. Without an overarching authority there
cannot be, as we have seen in the soccer example, capturing of the gains by poorer
nations. In other words, there is no reversal of the leg drain. The soccer example
illustrates the desirable type of globalization: do away with limits to labor mobility,
increase the overall output through interaction between people, make use of increasing
returns to skills, but then reinsure that some of the gains are shared by those who do not
have enough economic power. 19
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